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Abstract. "Completeness" is a necessity in any form of hazard 
identification or risk analysis. The analyst should know just 
which types of hazards he has found, and which remain uninve-
stigated. However, the theoretical framework for discussion of 
this problem has until now been missing. This report provides 
the theoretical framework from a parallel report (1). It inve-
stigates the completeness properties of a size risk analysis 
procedure in practice, during the construction and operation of 
a chemical plant. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the traps facing any risk analyst is that he completes 
an analysis, only to have the plant undergo a major disaster 
which was overlooked in his analysis. Nearly as bad is for a 
major omission to be found as a result of actual failures, »ven 
if a disaster does not result. This is surprisingly likely to 
happen. It has happened for WASH 1400 (Browns Ferry fire, 
possibly, and Three Mile Island), and for the Canvey Island 
study (LNG level switches). If risk analyses are to retain 
their credibility, then it will be necessary to describe what 
the intended coverage is, and what types of hazard can be 
expected to have been overlooked. 
When risk analysis is used as an aid in the design, the omis-
sions in hazard identification constitute more than just a 
professional embarrassment. Omissions can be responsible for 
causing accidents, in the sense that appropriate safety equip-
ment may be left out of the design, or especially hazardous 
features may be built in. 
In order to be able to discuss the problem of coverage or 
completeness of risk analyses, a theoretical framework is 
required. This paper presents such a framework. Further, 
experimental results are presented which shuw the kinds of 
completeness problems which are likely to arise, and the degree 
of completeness which can be expected for several analysis 
methods. The results are drawn from about four full scale 
commercial risk analysis projects in the chemical industry, and 
an experimental project in which many different methods were 
applied to the same batch processing plant at different 
construction stages, starting with the initial flow sheet, and 
continuing through to full production. 
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A general franework for analysts completeness 
If hazards are identified in an analysis, there are two 
possible fa**s for then. Either the hazards are tolerated, or 
they are eliminated. But to expect perfect identification is 
foolish. Sone hazards will renain unidentified because the 
methods used for identification are inperfect. But even with 
perfect methods, some hazards would remain unidentified because 
of lack of knowledge. The knowledge may be unavailable to the 
engineering community as a whole. 
As an example of lack of knowledge leading to oversights, the 
phenomenon of zinc embrittlenent of hot steel was virtually 
unknown outside the research laboratories before the I x-
borough enquiry. As another example, the phenomeon of cosmic 
alpha particle disturbance of computer circuits has only been 
recognised within the last few years. 
Even if a very complete hazard analysis has been produced, its 
value can be undermined because safety management is inade-
quate. New hazards can be introduced because of management 
actions or oversights. In making any risk analysis it is neces-
sary to make assumptions, including assumptions about how the 
plant will be managed. For example, it may be assumed that safe 
working procedures will be used in clearing flammable atmos-
pheres before welding begins. If management allows such proce-
dures to be ignored, then new hazards will be introduced which 
are not included in the hazard analysis. 
Studies of hazard analysis completeness will therefore always 
be subject to uncertainty regarding lack of knowledge, and to 
assumptions regarding adequacy of safety management. 
Degree of analysis detail 
All process plant accident hazards can be classified as explo-
sions, fires, drownings and asphyxiations, and mechanical 
impact and cutting accidents. This list is complete, with some 
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reservations for the definition of the word "accident". The 
list is not very detailed, however, and not very useful. 
As the degree of detail in an analysis increases, the scope for 
omission increases. Generally, the degree of completeness 
decreases also. Any discussion of completeness of an analysis, 
then, must first include a definition of the level of analysis 
detail. 
In the discussion of practical risk analysis trials described 
later, the degree of detail assumed is that of failure modes of 
individual components at the decomposition level where valves, 
pumps, filters and switches are typical. Analyses with a finer 
degree of detail are possible, such as individual vessel 
fittings, transistors, or switch springs. Similarly, it is 
possible to break analyses down into causes of component 
failure, such as corrosion, vibration, overloading, under-
dimensioning etc. In the later discussion of practical experi-
ence such more detailed analyses will not be covered. 
It is possible to carry out risk analyses on a less detailed 
level, where subsystems such as distillation columns, storage 
tanks, and chemical reactors are regarded as components. At 
even less detailed levels, a complete refinery or ammonia 
storage installation might be considered as a unit. Risk ana-
lyses are then based on statistical data from similar plant, 
perhaps with scaling factors to modify for size of plant. 
Such analyses will in principle give a complete coverage of the 
more common risks, depending on the amount of experience 
available. For example, if a few hundred system years of 
experience is available, then risks arising once per ten years 
should be reasonably well covered. Such analyses will not, 
though, indicate how to make detailed design improvements, and 
can be invalidated if there are just a few non-standard design 
details. 
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Measures of completeness 
A siaple aeasure of completeness of hasard analyses would be 
g"ff r of hf«fff iiftwtmed 
Number of possible Tiasards 
If this ratio has the value 1, then the analysis could be said 
to be absolutely complete. 
Such a measure is useless in practice, because, as indicated 
earlier, it is impossible to know when all possible hasards 
have been found. 
A more practical measure is historical completeness. This is 
defined as 
Number of hasards Identified by a particular method 
Number of hazards which can be identified 
in the plant from a standard list of case stories 
This is the measure which has been used by the author in prac-
tical studies. For this purpose the historical basis which was 
used is the collection of case stories in "Loss Prevention", 
and "Loss Prevention Bulletin". For study purposes these 
hazards have been extracted and drawn out as a "generic fault 
tree" |l|. 
Some hasard identification methods treat a specific class of 
hazards which is logically complete. Such completeness within a 
method defined class of hazards can be termed internal com-
pleteness. Failure mode and effects analysis is an example of a 
method for which at least the starting point (individual 
component failure modes) is logically complete. 
For methods which are in principle internally complete, two 
interesting questions arise. First, to what extent is the 
theoretical completeness achieved in practice (simple clerical 
errors, or mistakes, can prevent the ideal from being achiev-
ed). Second, given a complete identification of a class of 
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hasards, what hasards lie outside this class. This second 
question is very iaportant. because its answer will indicate 
how particular hasard analyses should be supplemented using 
alternative aethods. 
In S O M cases, hasards are deliberately excluded froa an ana-
lysis in order to reduce the effort involved. For example only 
single or double failure hasards nay be included, or only 
failure combinations occuring acre frequently than once per 
thousand years. Such cut-off rules are typically used to avoid 
drowning analyses in insignificant detail. 
When such cut-off rules are used, a better measure of complete-
ness is the proportion of historical risk analysed, defined by 
* *L f c 
for all hisards 
identified 
for all hazards 
from a case story 
list which could be identified 
Discrimination 
When a hazard has been identified as a potential source of 
risk, it is often necessary to perform further calculations to 
confirm that the hazard can actually arise. For example, 
cooling pump failure may lead to a chemical reactor overheat-
ing. Whether the temperature reached will be high enough to 
cause a runaway reaction will depend on the rate of heat 
generation and on the natural convection cooling. To decide 
whether the hazard is actual will require a fairly lengthy 
calculation and possibly some experiment. Alternatively a 
judgement may be made about the degree of hazard. 
Such judgements, made to avoid calculation work, introduce 
chances for hazards to be omitted which should be included in 
an anlysis. They also make it possible to include hazards in an 
analysis which cannot occur in practice. 
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A Mature of discrimination for a hasard analysis can be 
defined as 
The number of hasards in the plant hasard list 
in the plant hasard list 
This measure can be determined by taking a hasard analysis, and 
checking the listed hasards very carefully. It has been 
observed that when good hasard analysis aathods mrm used, the 
s*in difference between experienced and inexperienced analysts 
is that the experienced analysts achieve a higher degree of 
di scr initiation. 
The desire for a high degree of completeness obviously con-
flicts with the desire ror high discrinination, especially if 
the tine available for analysis is United, as it often is in 
industrial work. 
Evaluation of completeness and discrinination 
Evaluation of completeness can be achieved by comparing differ-
ent analyses, by comparing with caae story collections, and by 
following the plant analysed through commissioning and oper-
ation. All of these approaches have been used in the analysis 
experiments described here. 
Prtcncfl V^nn^ of completeness 1 
Hasard and operability analysis 
Hazard and operability analysis is one of the most popular 
approaches to hasard identification for process plant. The 
version studied here is one developed from Lawley's original 
method, with the aim of achieving a defined degree of complete-
ness. The plant is divided into 'vessels" or "volumes", and for 
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osen s range sf variables is studied, ths vsrisSlos chosen 
sneuld bo s thormodynsmleal ly complete set. and the ones chosen 
hers ore teape reture, pressure. level concent ret ion sf vsrieus 
substsnces. degree of nixing, surface tension, charge etc For 
eseh of these the causes and consequences of variations to« 
high and to« low are studied. Additionally the variation 
•breach of pressure boundary'* is studied. Causes and conse-
quences ars drawn up in tabular fora. 
Through the course of about ten analyses, a check list of 
causes has been built up. and included in standard analysis 
sheets. It has been observed that this greetly increases com-
pleteness (by about a factor of two) even when compered with 
analyses performed by experienced engineers. 
The method is typically applied to flow sheets and piping and 
instrumentation diagram*. This in itself limits the hasard 
analysis, since height effects such as air locks, head effects, 
proximity effects, and mechanical details are not well treated. 
Using the best available check list support, for a batch 
dlstilistion plant 30 hasards were identified using the method. 
Subsequently the list of hasards was extended to 124 items, 
giving the degree of completeness of the method in this esse of 
about 25* 121. 
The use of the hasard and operability method on s bstch process 
is perhaps an unfair test. It is rosily intended to treet 
divergences from a steady ststs of operation. The stsrting 
point for the procedure is itself logically complete provided 
that the plant is sufficiently finely divided up into volumes. 
The main problem which restricts the method seems to be that it 
does not lead the analyst to think of correct sequential 
functioning of plant equipment, and therefore does not indicste 
departures from correct functioning. 
where coaplex piping or control wiring is used in s plant, 
filling out cause and consequence columns of snalysis tables 
can be very complicated. In such esses it is better to extend 
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the analysis, so that it is carried out on a line by line 
basis, using high and low temperature, concentration, impuri-
ties, and high, low, zero, and reverse flow as guides to 
search. Alternatively, fault trees can be constructed to fill 
out cause columns, and consequence diagrams to fill out 
consequence columns. This extension added two additional ha-
zards to the 30 identified by the volume and volume method. 
In any case, hazard and operability studies should be supple-
mented by examination of reaction potential (reaction matrices) 
since the method does not in itself provide much guidance for 
treating these. 
Practical evaluation of completeness 2 
Action error analysis 
This method is a version of cause consequence analysis used to 
treat operating procedures. Operating procedures are written 
down action by action, and the effect on the plant of each 
action is noted. Then the effect of a range of possible errors 
for each action is considered, and the effect of the correct 
action lor a range of abnormal states of the components 
affected by the action. The action errors and plant events are 
drawn up on diagrams for which preprinted forms have been 
prepared. 
The range of errors treated is: 
ACTION TOO EARLY 
TOO LATE 
TOO MUCH 
TOO LITTLE 
TOO LONG 
TOO SHORT 
WRONG DIRECTION 
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ON WRONG OBJECT 
WRONG ACTION 
This set of errors is logically complete, but the list of WRONG 
ACTIONS must be limited in some way, for practical purposes. 
Also it is generally necessary to limit the number of failures 
and errors treated in any sequence to three or four. Otherwise 
the analysis becomes very lengthy and confusing. 
In practice, for the batch plant analysis, the action-error 
method applied after the hazard and operability method revealed 
a further 82 hazards, giving a degree of completeness of about 
66%, and bringing the completeness of the hazard and oper-
ability and action error methods together up to 90%. While 12 
plant modifications were made on the basis of the hazard and 
operability analysis, a further 30 were made on the basis of 
the action error analysis. 
Practical evaluation of completeness 3 
On site checks 
Many hazards can only be observed by inspecting the plant 
itself. For example, cables running over sharp edges cannot be 
seen on drawings. Nor can dirt blocking safety drains. 
In the batch distillation plant study inspection check lists 
were used as well as item by item inspection. A further ten 
hazards were discovered in this way. A further three were only 
Identified as a result of disturbances arising during commis-
sioning. 
Practical evaluation of completeness 4 
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Comparison with case stories 
As described earlier, a few thousand case stories were studied, 
and their hazard mechanisms drawn up on a generic fault tree. 
This proved to be a very effective way of checking the earlier 
analyses. The comparison took only about two hours. A further 
two hazards were revealed. This means that a good estimate of 
completeness for the hazard and operability analyses, action-
error analysis, and commissioning checks together was 97%. Of 
course different results might be found on other plants. Even 
if other hazards are discovered later, the percentages given 
here should not change very much. The 3% of hazards which were 
not found by the analyses might not be worrying in the case of 
plant approval risk assessments, but they are quite disturbing 
for analyses in support of plant design. On the other hand it 
is estimated that only about half of the hazards would have 
been found during normal design activities and commissioning. 
The reasons for the omissions are interesting. In one case a 
reaction was involved causing gas generation and scumming. The 
nature of the reaction is still unknown, and the problem has 
been solved by putting less residue in waste drums so that 
there is room for the scum. 
A second oversight was to overlook a pipe which could hold 
significant quantities of methanol, which could run backwards 
through a pump and escape. The problem could have been seen 
earlier if the line by line hazard and operability procedure 
had been used, or if coupling and decoupling tanker connections 
had been included as explicit actions in the operating proce-
dure . 
In a third case an unwelded joint was not seen until water 
pressure testing. Such problems cannot he prevented by ana-
lysis. 
In the last case, freezing of product within a condenser had 
been foreseen as a potential problem, but had not been given 
much weight. In practice cooling water temperature variations 
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prove to be larger than had been anticipated. 
Practical evaluation of completeness 5 
Probability calculations 
The process of transforming hazard identification lists to 
probability calculations has been found to increase both com-
pleteness and discrimination. Hazards are set more firmly in 
perspective, and in setting probabilities for one hazard cause, 
other possible causes are suggested. 
In full scale commercial studies of this effect has been found 
to increase completeness by one or two percent. 
Practical Evaluation of completeness 6 
Fault tree analysis 
Fault tree analysis applied manually at the component failure 
mode level has been found to suffer from several problems, in 
particular poor treatment of short circuit, burst pipe, errone-
ous valve opening or switch closing, and sequential control 
problems. Quite simple problems set as classroom examples have 
been found to be solved incorrectly, even by expert analysts. 
In practical use, for piping and wiring problems, a degree of 
completeness of about 80% has been observed, and a much lower 
degree of completeness for sequential control and plant operat-
ing problems. 
Automatic fault tree and consequence diagram construction 
These methods are currently being applied to the distillation 
plant example described earlier. They relate hazards directly 
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to disturbances described by mass and energy balance equations, 
and similar physical equations, and thoroughly developed fail-
ure mode lists for individual components. The methods have an 
internal completeness property, and treat thoroughly all dis-
turbances arising in plant variables as a result of component 
failures and the action errors described earlier. 
Comparison with the batch distillation plant manual analysis 
indicates that the hazards found by the hazard and operability 
analysis and the action error analysis are found, and that two 
of the errors found by on site checks were also found. The 
level of discrimination was lower, however. Studies are still 
in progress. Current results indicate that a degree of com-
pleteness of 94% should be achieved, and togetner with on site 
checks about 98%. 
Theoretically, the methods should lead to oversights where the 
model on which the analysis is based does not correspond to the 
actual plant. This will occur if drawings are not "as built", 
and if construction details are of low standard. Additionally, 
with the methods used, hazards arising as a result of potential 
energy of height are not included. As for all flow sheet or 
piping and instrumentation diagram based methods, mass and 
energy storages and flows, and substances and reactions which 
are not included in the analysts model will be omitted. This 
does not seem to have been significant in the present stuJly. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Different hazard analysis methods reveal different hazard 
types, and a range of methods is necessary if all hazards are 
to be detected. Absolute perfection cannot be expected. If the 
less time consuming methods are applied first, then a situation 
with diminishing returns will arise, where the more expensive 
methods reveal fewer problems, (. g. 2). At some stage the 
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costs of analysis will break even with the benefits arising 
from hazard reduction and elimination of commissioning and 
operating problems. The break even point will occur where the 
slope of the cost benefit curve is one, that is increase in 
cost equals increase in benefit. Monetary values can now be set 
on this curve, and some estimate can be mads of the risk 
remaining after different types of hazard analysis have been 
performed for process plant. 
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